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Executive summary 
 
In 2007, Defra launched a pilot grant scheme that provided funding for property-
level flood protection surveys and measures in six locations in England. In 
November 2009, in what was probably the first flood event to affect any of these 
areas subsequent to the implementation of the pilot,  the River Eden overtopped 
its banks and flooded one of the principal streets of Appleby-in-Westmorland.  
 
Six months later, this research was commissioned by Defra to discover what 
difference the government-funded measures had made to the people of the 
town, what factors had affected the implementation and effectiveness of the 
grant scheme and how the experience of the flood had changed attitudes 
towards this approach to flood risk management.  
 
This report details the findings of that research and is therefore of relevance to 
any local, regional or national bodies that are considering the introduction of 
similar schemes.  
 
Details of the scheme 
 
 Under the pilot scheme, homes and businesses were provided with a range 
of different protection measures (measures to prevent the ingress of flood-
water). These included demountable flood barriers, pumps, a new drain, 
water-resistant external render and a flood wall. In two cases, action taken 
involved the participation of the Highways Agency. 
 The scheme reinforced a culture of flood risk adaptation that already existed 
among some residents of Appleby. Prior to the pilot, however, residents had 
lacked confidence in their ability to choose between commercially available 
protection measures. Furthermore, protection tended to be home-made and 
piecemeal and was less common than resilience measures (measures 
designed to speed recovery, such as the raising of power sockets above the 
likely level of flooding).  
 Administration and public consultation costs incurred by the local authority 
and Environment Agency in implementing the scheme amounted to an 
estimated £70,000 – almost as much as the original £80,000 Defra grant, 
most of which was used to pay for surveys and the protection measures. 
Benefits of the scheme 
 The protection measures installed in the pilot reduced anxiety about 
flooding. 
 Wherever they were tested by the 2009 flood, the measures were successful 
in reducing disruption, damage and reinstatement costs. 
 However, this was a routine local flooding event and was well within the 
design tolerances of the measures. Residents accept that a severe flood 
such as that of 2005 would overwhelm the pilot measures. 
 The implementation of the scheme also reduced the need for flood risk 
management agencies to send emergency response resources to the town 
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during the flood and allowed them to use these resources in other flooded 
areas.  
 Although the experience of the 2009 flood boosted confidence in the 
reliability of the protection measures, pilot participants still did not fully trust 
them and continued to rely on supplementary protection from sandbags. 
 There was little evidence of a demonstration effect. It was too early to judge 
whether the example set by the scheme would inspire people to implement 
protection measures of their own accord. However, at the time of the 
research only one Appleby resident had been prompted by the scheme to 
buy his own protection measure and people in flood risk locations around 
the town showed little awareness of the scheme and had not changed their 
behaviour because of it. 
 Pilot participants did not believe that their insurance terms would be affected 
by the protection measures and so had not informed their insurers of the 
reduction in risk brought about by the scheme.  
Advantages of collective implementation 
 Implementation of the grant scheme at the level of the community 
encouraged collaboration between residents and therefore facilitated the 
more effective protection of mansion blocks and homes with party walls. 
 Collective implementation also fostered a greater sense of local solidarity; 
as did the inclusion in the scheme of local businesses as well as 
householders. 
 The introduction of the scheme acted as a catalyst for local collective 
organisation and the creation of a town flood plan. Local leaders are now 
treated by the Environment Agency as part of their emergency response 
network and the town is less dependent on external help during flooding. 
Factors influencing the success of the implementation of the pilot 
A number of factors affected the successful implementation of the Appleby pilot; 
 local people‟s receptiveness to the idea of the pilot, which resulted from the 
history of frequent flooding in the area, the impetus provided by the 
particularly severe flood in 2005 and the community‟s pride in its ability to 
survive events such as floods; 
 the dedication of Environment Agency and district council staff in the area 
and their perception of property-level protection not as a “last resort”, as it 
sometimes seen in the flood risk management industry, but as an option 
with unique benefits; 
 the ability of these staff to win the trust and respect of local people; 
 the commitment and financial support given to the scheme by local flood 
risk management agencies; 
 the presence in the community of suitable leaders and social structures. 
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Other Findings 
 The evidence of this research suggests the possibility that confidence in 
choosing measures might, in some cases, be a more important determinant 
of behaviour than the cost of measures. 
 Because it was supported and funded by the state, the pilot provided an 
extra „stamp of approval‟ for the concept of flood protection as well as for 
particular protection products that were used. 
 The protection products provided by the scheme had in some cases 
displaced home-made measures.  
 It is possible that the future performance of the scheme measures will be 
undermined if they are not properly maintained. 
 Additionally, the effectiveness of the scheme overall could be threatened if 
key actors withdraw or an absence of flood events causes participants to 
lose interest in flood protection.  
 Local flood risk management agencies therefore anticipate that they will 
need to provide ongoing support to scheme participants and community 
leaders. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
This report describes the findings of research conducted in the small Cumbrian 
town of Appleby-in-Westmorland that flooded shortly after residents and 
businesses were provided with grant-funded property-level flood protection 
measures. It looks at issues around the implementation of the grant scheme, its 
consequences for the impact of the flood and, in the longer term, for attitudes to 
flood protection and resilience. The lessons of this study are of relevance to any 
local, regional or national organisation that wishes to encourage individuals to 
take practical measures to reduce their exposure to flood risk.  
 
Property-level measures offer an alternative approach to flood risk 
management. Protection can prevent or slow water ingress, winning time for 
goods and possessions to be moved to safety and reducing damage to the 
fabric of buildings. Examples of protection include barriers across gates, doors, 
windows and airbricks, and measures to increase the water-resistance of walls 
and floors. On the other hand, the use of resilience measures assumes that 
water will gain ingress and reduces the vulnerability of fittings, fixtures and 
possessions. Examples of resilience include the use of water-resistant wall 
plaster, the raising of wall sockets and consumer units and the substitution of 
fitted carpets with ceramic tiles.  
 
For individual properties or small groups of properties in areas that flood 
frequently, property-level protection and resilience can be an appropriate and 
cost-effective means of reducing damage and disruption. Where the number of 
properties at risk is small, large-scale engineered solutions are unlikely to yield 
sufficient benefits to justify the funding of such measures by the state. At the 
same time, analysis by Entec and Greenstreet Berman (2008) suggests that the 
use of packages of protection / resilience measures can be cost-beneficial for 
households where the annual risk of flooding is approximately 2% or greater. 
Furthermore, property-level measures have the advantage of being less 
disruptive of the physical environment. 
 
Having made a commitment in its Making Space for Water (MSW) programme 
to investigate the potential benefits of property-level adaptation measures, in 
2007 Defra made £500,000 available for a pilot scheme that explored ways of 
delivering grants and assessed the likely take-up by property owners (Defra 
2008a). The pilot involved six locations and provided grants for 199 properties, 
of which 89% were residential and the remainder commercial. Schemes were 
delivered by local authorities in partnership with local offices of the Environment 
Agency, with funding of £5,000 being provided by Defra for each property that 
participated in the scheme (including £1,000 for surveys and administration 
costs). Analysis of the scheme funding showed that the average cost of works 
was about £2,900 per property (Defra 2008b). 
 
Two of these pilot areas have been the subject of independent, in-depth 
evaluation research. In 2008, interviews were conducted with householders 
involved in the Leeds pilot (Defra, 2008b - unpublished). This report focuses on 
data collected in a second pilot area, Appleby-in-Westmorland, which, at the 
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time of the research, was the only pilot area to have flooded subsequent to the 
implementation of the property-level adaptation measures.  
 
 
2.   The pilot scheme in Appleby-in-Westmorland 
 
Appleby-in-Westmorland is a small market town that lies in the north of Cumbria 
between the Pennines and the Lake District (Figure 1). Appleby‟s dairy and 
gypsum-extraction industries having closed in recent years, its economy relies 
mainly on agriculture and tourism, with visitors being attracted to the area by the 
historic town centre (Figure 2), the surrounding countryside and the annual 
Horse Fair and harness race.  
 
 
                  Figure 1 The location of the pilot site 
 
 
 
Appleby‟s significance as a town belies its relatively small population of 2,500. 
The nearest larger town, Penrith, is 20 minutes‟ drive and 14 miles to the 
northwest and the dearth of conurbations to the east, south and west, makes 
Appleby the nearest commercial hub for numerous hamlets and villages. The 
town boasts a castle and a grammar school of over 600 students that received 
its charter in the sixteenth century. Furthermore, until local government 
reorganisation in 1974 Appleby was the historic county town of Westmorland, a 
county with a population of over 70,000 that included towns such as Kendal, 
Grasmere, Windermere, Ambleside and Brough. 
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Figure 2 Appleby: a small market town surrounded by scenic countryside 
     
 
 
The town is also well known for the flooding it experiences. Apart from 
November 2009, other severe floods mentioned by people in the town include 
those of 1968, 1995 and “The Great Flood” of 2005. Lesser floods occurred 
between these more dramatic events. 
 
Figure 3 Illustration from a local newspaper, 
showing The Sands during the 1968 flood 
 
 
 
Although surface water causes problems in some parts of the town, most 
flooding in Appleby originates from the River Eden.  According to residents, the 
Eden overtops its banks approximately every second year. One participant in 
this research talked of there being two high-risk seasons in Appleby‟s year: the 
last two weeks in July, when heavy rainstorms can occur, and mid-October to 
March, when the Eden is swollen by snow-melt and rain falling onto the 
Pennines.  Two parts of the town have been most vulnerable to flooding from 
the Eden (Figure 3): the area located within the river bend, which includes 
sports grounds, a swimming pool, a church and a residential street; and a road 
known as The Sands, which runs immediately north of the river and comprises 
houses, flats, shops, businesses, a bowling green and a church.  
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In 1995, the Environment Agency offered the town a package of flood defence 
measures. However, although the measures were accepted for that part of the 
town within the river bend, residents and property-owners in the north of the 
town rejected the proposals for their area – partly for aesthetic reasons and 
partly because of issues relating to access to land and property.  As a result, 
while retractable barriers, heavy-duty flood gates, a bund and a flood wall now 
protect one part of the town, The Sands remains undefended and continues to 
flood regularly. 
  
 
Figure 5 An Environment Agency flood barrier  
by playing fields in the south of Appleby 
                                                                        
 
In 2007, two years after a particularly severe event had affected the town (as 
well as Carlisle and other parts of Cumbria), Appleby become one of the areas 
 
Figure 4 Map of Appleby, showing the River Eden and  
The Sands (top) 
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in the Defra pilot scheme. Using a Defra grant of £80,000, Eden Borough 
Council and the local Environment Agency (both based in Penrith) proceeded to 
provide property-level flood protection for 34 residential and 12 commercial 
properties - mostly on The Sands, but also in the south of the town, where there 
was a problem with run-off flooding. Two years later, in November 2009, the 
River Eden overtopped its banks once again and floodwater threatened 25 of 
the 46 protected properties. 
 
 
3.   The research 
 
This research was commissioned by Defra to investigate the impacts of the pilot 
measures on the consequences of the 2009 flood and to find out how the 
experience of using the protection measures had changed people‟s attitudes 
and behaviours with regard to adaptation. It also aimed to learn about the role 
played in the implementation of the scheme by the relationships between key 
agencies and the residents and businesses of Appleby. 
 
To address these questions, in-depth interviews were conducted with local 
people, with recruitment being conducted door-to-door and at various times of 
day in order to maximise the response rate and ensure diversity amongst the 
type of respondents. 
 
To investigate factors influencing the implementation of the scheme as well as 
its impact on participants and non-participants, the research sample included 
those responsible for setting up the pilot and people from both inside and 
outside the pilot area (Table 1). The sample of people from within the pilot area 
was designed to reflect the composition of the population in the area and 
therefore included a mixture of businesses, tenants, owner-occupiers, landlords 
and community groups. Of these, thirteen had received full packages of 
protection, one had received partial protection and one had declined to 
participate in the scheme (Table 2).  
 
Table 1 Key characteristics of the research participants 
Interviewee characteristics 
 Householders Landlords Small 
businesses 
Community 
group 
Scheme 
organisers 
Total 
 Owners Tenants 
Interviews  7 4 2 7 1 3 23 
Respondents* 8 5 2 7 1 5 27 
* Four interviews involved two respondents 
 
 Table 2 Participants‟ involvement in the pilot scheme 
Extent of participation – respondents from within the pilot area 
Received full 
protection 
Received partial 
protection 
Refused to 
participate 
13 1 2 
 
To identify nearby at-risk properties that were not invited to participate in the 
pilot, the researcher relied on local information and the Environment Agency‟s 
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flood maps. Of the four properties that were thus identified, one lay within the 
town and three were in villages and hamlets within a five mile radius of Appleby.  
Interviews were semi-structured. That is, although a similar range of topics was 
covered with all respondents, the interviewer did not adhere to any question 
order or format. Respondents‟ views and experiences were allowed to emerge 
in their own form and according to their own priorities, and respondents‟ 
comments were probed by the interviewer in order to achieve a deeper 
understanding of their perspectives and motivations. 
 
Most research interactions were recorded and on the three occasions when this 
was not possible, hand-written notes were made immediately following the 
interviews. Recordings were professionally transcribed and the interviews were 
then analysed to produce the findings reported here.   
 
 
4.   Flood risk adaptation before the pilot  
 
As described in the paragraphs below, many people in the pilot area had 
already adapted to the flood risk in some way before the scheme was launched. 
This suggests that local people were already aware of the notion of adaptation 
and indicates that they were probably more willing than other communities to 
welcome participation in the Defra grant scheme. It also means, however, that 
the economic benefits of the scheme were less than they would have been if, as 
is often assumed by models that estimate the benefits of such measures (Entec 
et al, 2008), no measures had previously been in place.  
 
4.1. Flood action plans 
 
A number of businesses had flood action plans in place. These included plans 
for raising stock above flood levels or removing it to safer parts of the premises 
or even to other properties outside the floodplain. In some of the more well-
established businesses, managers and staff were familiar with the procedure to 
be followed in a flood (“everybody knows the ropes; everybody knows what to 
do”), were apparently un-daunted by what it involved and were able to 
implement plans quickly and efficiently. 
 
Figure 6 Stanchions for home-made flood barriers – seen here either side of the 
entrance to a goods yard 
 
  13 
 
 
4.2. Deployable protection measures 
 
In addition, some people had taken rudimentary protection measures (figures 6 
and 7). Most of these relied on plywood door-boards and sandbags, but one 
business had used a more sophisticated technique, blocking access to its yard 
by placing wooden boards between two permanent stanchions and inserting a 
damp-proof membrane before adding a layer of sandbags. 
 
Figure 7 A home-made plywood door-barrier 
 
 
 
4.3. Sandbags 
 
In spite of their not forming very effective barriers against floodwater, sandbags 
were relied on heavily in the town and this reliance seemed to be based on 
more than a presumption of their effectiveness. Respondents frequently 
represented their town as a place in which people pulled together in response to 
external threats. This representation of the town‟s collective identity appeared to 
be rooted not only in the response to the floods but also to historic raids 
mounted on Appleby by the Scots; to the influx of tourists, gypsies and 
“criminals” during the annual horse fair, and to the usurpation of Appleby by 
Penrith, when the latter became the administrative capital of the area in 1974. 
The association between flooding and other threats is signified by the sounding 
of a claxon when there is a raised danger of flooding – a clear echo of the World 
War II, when the same claxon was intended to warn residents of attacks of a 
different kind. The use of sandbags during a flood, and their distribution 
amongst fellow residents by those with suitable vehicles seemed to represent 
an expression of this spirit of independence and resistance. 
 
It could be argued, therefore, that sandbags play an important role in the 
facilitation of social solidarity in response to flood risk. People in Appleby are 
proud of their community-led system to distribute sandbags and of the way in 
which they pull together to ensure that they are delivered to those that need 
them. The delivery of this system provides a raison d’être for the flood action 
group, which, in turn, makes the town relatively self-sufficient during minor 
floods and reduces the need for intervention by the geographically distant local 
agencies. The provision of sandbags also helped maintain good relations 
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between the town and the local flood risk management agencies, for the 
continued provision of sandbags countered the suspicion that they were 
neglecting the needs of Appleby people. In fact, it was said that town leaders 
only agreed to participate in the pilot scheme because it was presented 
alongside a proposal to devise a more organised and systematic system for 
storing and distributing sandbags – something that the town could do for itself, 
without the need for external aid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, unlike many other protection measures, sandbags need no 
previously-installed fittings and are equally appropriate in almost any 
circumstance. As a result, the equitable provision of sandbags can be 
represented as favouring no-one and helping everyone – a characteristic that 
reinforces the sense of unified struggle in the face of flood risk, which itself has 
widespread social benefits. 
 
4.4. Intrinsic protection measures and resilience 
 
As well as the deployable flood barriers just described, a range of resilience and 
intrinsic protection measures had also been implemented prior to the pilot, 
mostly as part of the reinstatement of properties following previous floods – 
particularly the more severe events of 1995 and 2005 – or as part of planned 
refurbishments or extensions.  
Figure 8 Residents deploying sandbags - The Sands, 1995 
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Figure 9 An example of an intrinsic protection  
measure: a raised building extension 
 
      
 
 
One property owner had installed water-resistant flooring and a drainage point 
in the most vulnerable room of his house and raised the thresholds of all 
adjoining rooms in order to contain and drain the flood water. Another had 
raised all the floors and airbricks, replaced wooden floors with concrete and 
bricked-up the river-facing door, replacing it with a new entrance at the back of 
the building. Others had moved electric sockets higher up walls, used water-
resistant render on walls and, in one case, taken care to purchase items that 
could easily be moved away from the floodwater (e.g. laptops instead of PCs). 
When owners of one building near Appleby built an extension onto their 
property, they raised the level of the floor to put it beyond the reach of flood-
water (Figure 9).  
 
4.5. Reasons for implementing measures 
 
The adaptive actions taken before the pilot appear to have been motivated and 
facilitated by three factors: people‟s awareness of the risk when they decided to 
move to, or remain in, the area; their recognition and acceptance of the risk 
from flooding, and the availability of the skills and understanding needed to 
select and implement the measures. 
 
In keeping with the findings of previous research (Harries 2008a), analysis of 
the interviews in Appleby suggests that one reason for adaptive action was 
people‟s acceptance of the existence of an ongoing risk. Research in areas less 
well-known for flooding reveals that people sometimes choose to deny the 
existence of the risk, characterising floods as „freak events‟ and refusing to 
represent their localities as permanently at risk (Harries 2008a). Respondents in 
this research, in contrast, represented flooding and flood risk as normal 
characteristics of their town and accepted that their properties would continue to 
be at risk. This enabled them to act to reduce their exposure to that risk:  
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Well, we‟d had the property since the 1950s and we knew how much it used to flood – 
and it was getting worse, so [after the 1995 flood] we just decided that we‟d take what 
precautions we could at the time.  
 
Acceptance appears to be driven by two factors: familiarity with flooding and the 
extent to which exposure to the risk is voluntary. Many residents of the pilot 
area had lived in or around Appleby for most of their lives and were therefore 
familiar with the issue of flooding. Even those who had only recently moved 
onto the floodplain had been aware of the floods before they did so and, in 
many cases, had witnessed them personally. As a result, people accepted that 
floods would occur regularly and there was little evidence of psychological 
denial: 
 
Interviewer When you decided to move here, did the flooding come into your 
consideration? 
Respondent Yes, it did. And one of the first things we actually did was, like, [ask the 
landlord] and he said it will flood. And [we knew about] the devastation 
from [name of friend] being here at the 2005 floods. And I also 
actually...I‟d not long started flat-sharing with [name of other friend] 
when he‟d only just moved back into his house after that being refitted 
as well, so it never bothered me because I mean like, as a teenager I 
went out and helped do sandbagging on [name of street]. I mean I‟ve 
lived on [name of a street that floods] as well.  
 
Most residents and businesses had made a conscious choice to locate in the 
flood risk area. Attracted by a combination of lower housing costs, the attractive 
location, proximity to the town centre and access to passing trade, respondents 
often argued that the advantages of The Sands outweighed the disadvantages 
of the flooding. Furthermore, it was well-known that local people were 
themselves partially responsible for the existence of the risk because they had 
rejected the structural solution offered them by the Environment Agency in 
1985.  
 
Alongside acceptance, a second important factor determining behaviour is 
confidence about the right way of adapting to a flood risk. Respondents in this 
research had relatively high levels of confidence in planning and implementing 
their approach to adaptation. In part, this was due to an accumulation of 
experience from the floods they had lived through. With each flood, people 
become more aware of the most productive ways of reducing their risk 
exposure. The following passage shows, for example, how the experience of 
one flood can furnish householders with the knowledge they need to reinstate 
homes with minimal disruption and increased resilience: 
 
I don‟t think what my insurance company did was correct in certain areas. They took the 
plaster off to three foot all around the house and everywhere – we didn‟t get 
contaminated water in here, we only got clean water in here! So I would take all the kick 
boards off, rip the floor up, dry everything out and then I would replace them bits myself 
because I think that‟s all that would be required. Probably renew the skirting boards and 
things like that, but make sure everything is properly dried out. I would concrete the floor 
in there. 
 
Furthermore, when it comes to resilience, advice is easily available in Appleby. 
The Sands itself boasts a building firm and a builders merchant and numerous 
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respondents were either builders or had professional backgrounds that enabled 
them to understand flood damage mitigation issues. Due to the social dynamics 
of life in the town, these skills were accessible to residents from less practical 
backgrounds:  
 
[...] anybody [who] owns a shop in Appleby drinks in [the same two] pubs and everybody 
gets to know each other and that‟s where a lot of, you know, like business is sought for 
like, you know, if you need a plumbing job done. You go to the [name of pub] and you‟ll 
find [name], who‟s an electrician. You go to the [name of second pub] and there‟s a guy 
called [name] who‟s the man for plumbing, and so on. So that, I think, creates...that is the 
main cement of Appleby community for me. 
 
In summary, respondents accepted that their area flooded frequently, felt 
certain that no large-scale defence was forthcoming and were familiar with the 
manner of flooding and the kind of damage it was likely to cause. As a result, 
they were relatively willing and able to implement adaptation measures and to 
plan how to respond to future floods. 
 
4.6. Limitations of the measures in place 
 
However, the protection and resilience measures in place prior to the pilot had 
generally developed in a piecemeal fashion and often provided incomplete 
adaptation to the risk. One respondent described how he first installed a flood 
board and only learned when it next flooded that he also needed anti-backflow 
valves to prevent water coming up through the drains. Another property-owner 
had a home that was resilient to flooding but had not considered buying door- 
and gate-barriers to enable him to retain use of his home and garden during a 
flood. Similarly, businesses with action plans in place for the evacuation of stock 
had no means of protecting the show-rooms themselves. Notably, none of the 
respondents had purchased any of the manufactured protection products 
available on the market, such as airbrick covers or engineered barriers. 
 
Figure 10 Flood protection measures in action in Appleby before the pilot scheme 
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5.   The implementation of the pilot scheme 
 
As a result of their repeated experiences over many years, people in the town 
had assimilated the notion of flooding into their collective identities, representing 
Appleby as „the town that floods‟ and the people of Appleby as „the people who 
resist and survive floods‟. Although flooding was disruptive and sometimes 
frightening, respondents demonstrated pride in their ability to deal with it. One of 
the challenges faced by the authorities was to find a way of harnessing that 
pride and not undermine it. 
 
To make the most of this sense of pride and avoid offending it, staff from the 
Environment Agency and the local authority ensured that townspeople were 
able to feel that they themselves were choosing how to manage their flood risk 
rather than having solutions imposed on them. This, it was said, took patience 
and tact. Both these organisations were sometimes viewed with suspicion by 
people from Appleby – both are based in Penrith, a town considered alien 
because of its distance and because it lies outside historic Westmorland, and 
the Environment Agency was blamed for the flooding because of its failure to 
dredge the river. Beginning from a position of assumed opposition, these two 
agencies therefore had to work hard to win the trust and support of the town. 
 
Accordingly, it was reported that rather than trying to impose their ideas on the 
town, the local authority and the Environment Agency asked people for their 
own proposals and supported their efforts to implement them. This was 
described by one local flood risk professional as follows:  
 
What we did is, we got those people, effectively through the town council, to come and sit 
down with us and say, „accept the fact that there are going to be times when Eden District 
Council cannot be coming here [to help deal with a flood]. In such a situation, what do you 
think would be of benefit to you?‟ And the first and most obvious one they come up with 
is, „we want to be able to have more control over sandbagging‟. 
 
Rather than creating a situation of dependence (it’s their job to protect us) and 
resentment (they don’t care about Appleby), this tapped into the sense of pride 
and resistance associated with the town. People in the town remembered how, 
in the past, residents had worked together to supply each other with sandbags – 
and they wanted to reinstate that source of pride. Despite doubts over the 
effectiveness of sandbagging, the Environment Agency helped the town 
achieve that aim; providing administrative support, expertise and 
encouragement for the setting up of a highly organised system that mobilises 
large numbers of Appleby‟s residents in the distribution of sandbags and the 
provision of hot food and drink for flood victims and emergency workers. As a 
result, rather than being offered the role of „victim‟, people from Appleby were 
able to be active participants in the response to the floods. Rather than waiting 
for others to solve the flood risk problem, the attitude now was, “Let‟s show 
them [the borough council] what we can do!” This is revealed by the enthusiasm 
with which they spoke of the role they play and the impact they perceive it to 
have on the perception of their town: 
 
You can‟t have your hand held all the time. You‟ve got to do things for yourself. [...] I think 
we cooked about five kilos of bacon that day [for emergency workers and flood victims]. 
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Yeah, we went to the local butchers – he gave it to us at cost. We bought bread. And I‟ve 
now got under the stairs a big plastic box with sugar, tea, coffee. 
 
One of the workmen that came in on [the day of the flood], he said, “well, I‟d like to tell 
you that this town is the best organised town of any of these floods locally!” 
 
The establishment of a sense of partnership was not easy for the flood risk 
management authorities. Described as “a very time-consuming process”, it took 
a great deal of resource and considerable personal commitment by the relevant 
personnel to generate understanding of the issues and enthusiasm for the pilot 
scheme. As the professional flood risk managers additionally reported, a further 
difficulty was that it required them to trust residents and small businesses with 
the responsibility of deploying the various measures correctly, whilst knowing 
that the agencies, and not the public, were likely to be blamed if things went 
wrong. This necessitated a strong working relationship between the two 
agencies as well as commitment to the scheme by the local authority, which 
had to bear the risk of the scheme being deemed a failure and also the 
opportunity costs of having staff taken away from other work. 
 
In practice, however, both the town and the two agencies benefitted from this 
approach. By bolstering the town‟s pride and sense of independence, the local 
authority and the local Environment Agency became seen by Appleby people as 
partners in their fight against flood risk. Although the up-front investment of time 
was great, volunteer leaders of the town‟s team now form part of the 
Environment Agency‟s emergency response network. It was argued by the 
professional flood risk managers that Appleby was now largely self-sufficient 
during floods; that this made a valuable contribution to the resources available 
to the authorities during a flood, and that this was a very significant benefit of 
the scheme: 
 
As it is, [for] the kind of flooding that it‟s designed to protect, it works very well. But I 
personally think that the bigger benefit really, which wasn‟t what it was designed to do, 
has been the development of the community [...] As a result of this, a lot more people got 
[involved]. It‟s just been an inroad for [the Environment Agency] to do all sorts of sterling 
work with the community groups [...] 
 
As the above quote implies, a second potential barrier to the successful 
implementation of the scheme was the fragmented social structure within the 
town. Life in any small community breeds resentments and difficult relationships 
and respondents suggested that Appleby was no exception to this. There were 
areas of friction between established families who had lived and worked in the 
town for generations and as well as between these same families and newer 
arrivals whose priorities conflicted with the customary approach taken by 
Appleby people. These differences and difficulties had hindered efforts to 
manage the flood risk – past meetings on the subject were described as 
fractious and attempts at dialogue as having ended with key actors pulling out 
due to personal grievances. As a result, although the town had in the past 
organised the coordinated distribution of sandbags and other assistance, efforts 
to resuscitate this tradition were said to have ended in acrimony and 
disaffection.  
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These divisions were said to have been overcome as a result of the presence of 
strong, motivated leadership and the existence of two external catalysts for 
change: the 2005 flood and the galvanising affect of the possibility of 
participating in the pilot scheme. 
 
Interest in flood risk adaptation will always be greatest immediately after a flood, 
so it is little surprise that the experience of 2005 motivated people to work to 
address the flood risk in Appleby. The more vivid a risk is, the harder it is to 
deny it (Nisbett and Ross 1980), so it is understandable that the experience of 
the 2005 flood was a strong motivator for action. In that event, floodwaters rose 
to a depth of four feet in The Sands; two people had to be rescued by the 
emergency services from one of the shops and at 3am a decision was taken to 
evacuate even the defended areas in the centre of the town (Robertson and 
Koronka 2005). The impact of these events on the behaviour of the 
townspeople was compounded by the fact that it came on top of a history of 
frequent, less severe floods. When an event begins to retreat into the past it can 
seem better to allow the memory to fade rather than to risk high levels of 
anxiety (Harries 2008b). However, the frequency of flooding and the 
prominence of the risk make this difficult in Appleby, where the River Eden 
overtops its banks every two or so years and flood defence measures in the 
centre of the town are a constant reminder of the seriousness of the rarer 
events. As a result, these experiences gave people in the town the 
determination to fight harder than ever to create a collective response to the 
risk, prompted both by the suffering they had seen amongst their neighbours 
and by their desire to be “public spirited”. As one resident put it, 2005 was “so 
bad that we really [had to] do something about it”. 
 
The invitation to participate in the grant scheme gave an extra impetus to this 
desire, for it promised a tangible reward to those who committed themselves to 
collaborative action. This is explained by one of the professional flood risk 
managers: 
 
Because suddenly, they‟ve got a reason that they‟re working together. You got sixty 
people who are all talking to each other about the fact that they can get [protection] 
products; this is what‟s going to happen. And they‟re beginning to see that if you‟re part of 
a terrace and I‟m part of a terrace, and you don‟t do something and I do, you‟ve not 
achieved anything, [and that] therefore you need a collective response to make 
something work.  
 
As suggested in the above quote, in addition to needing joint working amongst 
the leadership of the town, this also required cooperation between immediate 
neighbours. In terraced houses and mansion blocks a failure to protect one 
home from flooding can easily lead to water passing into neighbouring 
properties through party walls or foundations. Even where homes are not 
physically linked, the best available solution might be to construct bunds or 
walls that impact on several properties at once, or to install a new drain in one 
garden that benefits several neighbours. 
 
The need to work together also has other advantages. In Appleby it reinforced 
the notion of community solidarity in the face of the flood risk and built a 
stronger overall resilience than would have been achieved if individuals had 
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worked alone. Furthermore, the possibility that protection measures will not be 
implemented if a householder is away or on holiday is a frequently cited reason 
for not wanting to use barriers that require deployment; and some people might 
be too frail to deploy them by themselves anyway. Where neighbours work 
together on the implementation of a scheme they are more likely and more able 
to help each other out in such circumstances. In the Leeds pilot, people held 
keys for the cupboards in which their neighbours stored their barriers and a 
system was in place to help elderly people set up their protection.  
 
 
Figure 11 Front view of a group of three homes 
involved in the pilot scheme 
 
 
 
Respondents claimed that all this collaboration was only possible because of 
the type of people who took up leadership on the issue of managing the flood 
risk. They argued that successful leadership requires someone who can win the 
involvement and collaboration of a sufficient body of people who are in a 
position to help; someone who knows “the people that matter” and is able to 
enlist them in the task of motivating the wider population behind a scheme. 
 
In Appleby, a core group of local people led the implementation from the town 
side. This team of four had footholds in most of the institutions whose 
contributions to the organisation of the town‟s flood preparedness were 
essential – the borough council, the town council, the fire service, the Rotary 
Club and the Inner Wheel (an organisation for female relatives of Rotary Club 
members) – as well as other important institutions such as the grammar school 
and the scout group. The support of these institutions gave the initiative access 
to a wide range of resources, including equipment, storage, organisational 
skills, professional contacts, technical expertise and catering facilities. As these 
organisations intersect with the lives of a wide range of Appleby people, their 
support also gave the initiative credibility with a wide cross-section of residents 
and businesses.  
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Despite the overall success of the scheme in winning the support of local 
people, not all residents were convinced to participate and not all of those who 
accepted a grant were willing to pay for additional measures to supplement 
those provided. It seems likely that historical grudges against local agencies 
played their part in this. Some residents had a history of disagreements with 
these agencies and the good feeling generated by the scheme and by the 
approach taken by the Environment Agency and local authority officers seems 
to have been insufficient to overcome these memories. A sense of fatalism 
might also have played a role – a familiarity with the disruption and distress 
caused by flooding, the knowledge that flooding can be survived, and a 
resignation to its recurrence (“you have to put up with it, don‟t you”). For these 
residents, the costs of participating in the scheme seem not to have been 
outweighed by the promised savings promised. 
 
 
6.   The measures provided by the scheme 
 
Participants in the Appleby pilot benefitted from a range of different flood 
protection measures. Unlike pilot areas such as Leeds, where the standard 
design of the houses allowed a standard product to be used, measures were 
tailored to the needs of individual properties. Furthermore, in two cases it was 
decided that collective solutions were more appropriate than measures that 
protected only one property. 
 
One of these collective solutions regarded four terraced properties on The 
Sands. These properties – a pub and three houses – flooded both from the river 
and also from run-off that flows down the hill onto The Sands. With the 
cooperation and financial support of the Highways Agency, a wall was erected 
at the front of the properties between the pavement and the road; a series of 
deployable aluminium flood barriers were installed to block access points for 
pedestrians and delivery vehicles, and a pump was provided for the extrusion of 
water (Figure 12). Responsibility for the gates and pump is shared by the 
residents and the pub licensee and the equipment is stored in an open alley-
way where it is easily accessed. 
 
This most permanently visible feature of the scheme caused concern amongst 
residents, who feared it might damage the aesthetic integrity of the river-front 
area. However, participants in the research indicated that the wall had now 
been accepted and those living or working behind the wall were pleased with its 
effectiveness both at holding back floodwater and also at shielding the 
properties from vehicles on the road.  
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Figure 12 The flood wall that was constructed in front of four properties on The Sands 
 
                 
 
 
A second example of collective protective action concerns a cluster of three 
conjoined properties in the south of Appleby that flood with surface water from 
the front and overland water from behind (see Figures 11 and 13). In this case, 
the scheme provided deployable barriers for gates and doors and an outside 
drain and drainage point and the scheme organisers also worked with the 
Highways Agency to reduce the flooding from the road.  
 
Figure 13 The field behind the properties in Figure 11 and the entrance to the drain (fenced 
area) 
    
 
 
It was reported that the negotiation of the aforementioned package of measures 
took a considerable amount of Environment Agency and local authority time. 
The property owners had strong ideas about what the problems were and what 
work needed to be done to address them. They were, indeed, experts on their 
own flooding and their knowledge was necessary to the creation of a solution. 
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Professional flood risk managers described how it took several on-site meetings 
to obtain the necessary information, reassure the owners that they were taking 
it on board and help reach a joint decision about which measures to use: 
 
It was quite an intense level of attention. And at certain points these householders would 
ring me up or they‟d text me and say, “It‟s raining now, do you want to come out and have 
a look at the field.” And you‟d kind of go, well you know, „yeah, better had go‟. I think it 
was that level of service that they‟d been provided with [that enabled us to have such a 
good relationship with them]. 
Winning the support of local people for the scheme and reaching agreement on 
the choice of options took a great deal of time on the part of the scheme‟s 
administrators. They spoke of the importance of being seen to listen to 
residents and reaching decisions on the basis of an agreed evaluation of the 
situation. In cases such as the above, this meant learning from those who had 
experienced the flooding and who sometimes, therefore, had better knowledge 
of its provenance. In other cases it meant facilitating learning within the 
community by bringing together different local perspectives and guiding groups 
towards a more evidence-based notion of what caused the flooding and how to 
protect against it. The professional flood risk managers stressed the importance 
of allowing local people to take ownership of the problem and its solution rather 
than obliging them to accept the explanations offered by external experts. 
Taking this approach allowed owners to feel proud of the measures that had 
been implemented and to assimilate them into that aspect of their social identity 
that was based on the notion of resilience. 
 
In a third case of collective action, the attempt to protect a block of flats almost 
faltered over the hesitation of one landlord. In this example, the challenge was 
to ensure the integrity of the protection by convincing the owners of all eight 
flats to implement the measures. Only after numerous attempts did the scheme 
organisers manage to contact the landlord of the eighth flat and convince him 
that, for the good of the other residents, it was necessary to participate in the 
pilot. 
 
The measures provided for these flats were the most common feature of the 
scheme in Appleby: steel-boxed frames that expand telescopically and are 
covered by a waterproof neoprene jacket.  
 
     Figure 14 An expandable barrier seen     Figure 15 The equipment used to deploy  
from behind          the barriers 
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These barriers require no permanent fittings. Once placed in position, a spanner 
is used to expand each guard horizontally and vertically and respondents 
explained that they need to be edged with sealant. The lack of permanent 
fixings was an advantage in Appleby, where many of the properties are listed 
and planning permission for permanent changes can be difficult to acquire. On 
the other hand, it was reported that the deployment of these barriers required a 
certain amount of mechanical adeptness and confidence and a few respondents 
claimed that this had caused them some difficulties and that barriers had 
sometimes been fitted incorrectly.  
 
As illustrated in Figure 15, readiness to deploy these barriers necessitates the 
storage of appropriate tools and materials such as spanners and sealant, as 
well as of the barriers themselves. It also requires communally accessible 
storage space away from direct sunlight, such as the under-stair cupboard 
purpose built by one landlord in Appleby (Figure 16). Where openings are of 
different sizes, the labelling of each gate facilitates easier deployment. Although 
respondents expressed no doubts over their ability to fulfil these needs, there 
was some evidence that not all were complying with the manufacturer‟s 
recommendation that the products are washed after each use. 
 
 
Figure 16 Barriers and associated 
equipment – as stored under the 
communal stairs in one block of flats 
 
 
 
Deployable barriers were supplied to commercial properties as well as domestic 
ones. Figure 17 shows them being used to protect a fish-and-chip shop. In this 
example, permanent stanchions had been fitted to link four barriers together.  
 
In many cases, the provision of these barriers was complemented by more 
general improvements to the water resistance of buildings, such as the 
provision of water-resistance rendering and the installation of non-return valves 
in main sewers or household sewers.  
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7.   Direct impacts of the pilot measures 
 
The system put in place by the Defra pilot scheme received its first test in 
November 2009, when the River Eden burst its banks1 and flood water reached 
25 of the properties protected in the scheme. With a maximum depth of about 
450mm, this was a far smaller flood than that in 2005 and was therefore within 
the performance specification of the products provided in the pilot. Respondents 
reported that the measures were generally successful and that they kept out far 
more water than sandbags alone had done in the past. What leakage there was 
through the barriers was dealt with using pumps, so properties were kept 
substantially dry and no evacuations were necessary. 
  
 
The experience of the 2009 flood gave an important boost to confidence in the 
measures introduced by the pilot. The assurances of suppliers and scheme 
organisers had not been taken on trust and none of the respondents mentioned 
the BSI Kitemark, let alone said that it had given them confidence in the 
products that bore it. Rather, people asserted that they needed to witness the 
effectiveness of the measures at first hand before they would believe in them:  
 
I suppose I reserved judgment because I didn‟t know... You know, when you see this 
thing in a box and then that is supposed to stop the floodwater from getting into your 
property. It‟s sort of hard to, you know, like the...if that makes any sense. I just couldn‟t 
see how it was going to work until it was actually jacked out into the doorframe. 
 
We just stacked [the sandbags] up in front of the blue boards just to sort of like reinforce 
the water. And because we‟d never seen them getting wet, we had no idea what was 
going to happen with it or what would happen with the silicone if it was just going to rot 
and fall away from the sandstone, stuff like that. So it was a case of, just let‟s have [the 
sandbags]. 
                                            
1 For video footage of the event, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=acEa46ezSsw 
Figure 17 Deployment of barriers in front of a food 
outlet on The Sands 
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Figure 18 Flooding in The Sands – November 2009 
 
 
The experience of the 2009 flood did not eliminate all doubts about the pilot 
measures. Although the demonstration of the effectiveness of the barriers in the 
worst-hit properties convinced some that they could be trusted, others felt that 
they needed to experience their effectiveness more fully and more personally 
before they would drop their reliance on previous tactics:  
 
The [door-boards] haven‟t been fully tested to the limit yet. And I think people are still a 
little bit wary as to how [they] are going to work. [...] I mean it came up to a level where it 
was just soaking lightly but it wasn‟t the full force of the river hitting that blue board. So 
we‟ve that yet... got that yet to come. 
 
As a result, some residents continue to claim that sandbags constitute an 
essential aspect of household protection (see Figure 19). The local authority is 
now trying to persuade the town‟s flood forum that it needs fewer sandbags in 
future floods, but the success of this attempt has yet to be proven and evidence 
from the interviews suggests that residents will continue to require sandbags 
with which to „reinforce‟ flood barriers. 
 
Neither could the pilot measures solve all the challenges faced by the dozen or 
so micro businesses in the area. In some of the larger premises the size of the 
at-risk area was too large to be easily protected and the amount of money 
available from the grant would only have made a small contribution to the costs 
of full protection. As a result, flooding continued to necessitate large-scale 
evacuation of stock and equipment and in November 2009 these businesses 
exercised their flood action plans as usual – though at the cost of just one or 
two days‟ of lost business.  
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Figure 19 Residents and businesses used sandbags to 
supplement the measures supplied by the pilot scheme 
  
 
Although several businesses on The Sands experienced reduced flood damage 
and disruption thanks to the demountable barriers provided, this was not always 
the case. Some reported that lack of confidence in the barriers had caused 
them to dismantle more equipment and move more stock than was necessary. 
In these cases, the full benefits of the protection measures will only be realised 
when experience of the measures has generated an increased confidence in 
their capacity to prevent water ingress. In another case, the problem was less 
with the floodwater than with the associated levels of humidity, which would 
spoil much of the stock even if the barriers were fully effective. 
 
 
Figure 20 A garage on The Sands during the 2009 flood - a barrier provided by the 
pilot scheme is visible on the showroom door 
 
 
 
Apart from the reduction in disruption and damage, a further benefit of the pilot 
scheme was that it reduced anxiety amongst the householders and businesses 
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involved. As the following quotes from different respondents illustrate, people 
living and working in the pilot area were able to feel less worried and anxious 
and more secure than they would otherwise have done. Such benefits are 
difficult to measure and reflect in traditional benefit-cost analyses, but they are 
of great importance to residents and small businesses in at-risk areas. 
 
I do feel that (pauses)...I‟m not worried every time it starts raining in sort of January, 
February, which at one time we were. You know, if you had a storm coming in, if you saw 
a depression, and you were sort of looking at the weather forecast and where‟s it going to 
hit. 
 
To think that we would be left with just sandbags is quite frightening now that we‟ve seen 
what [the door-boards] can do.  
 
From what I saw of the [door-boards] and how they worked, I was kind of quite impressed 
with them. And I would actually put quite a lot of faith in them. If I didn‟t have them then I 
think I would have been a lot more tense. I‟d be a lot more unhappy about having to live 
here. I do draw quite a lot of security knowing that they‟re just out there. 
 
Before I had the drain in [...] I would be listening most of the night for the gurgle of my 
pump going because I knew if my pump stopped we could get water in again. So we did 
have anxious times. But that‟s what I‟m saying: that drain has relieved that anxiousness 
and I can go to sleep now knowing that that drain will cope.  
 
 
8.   Indirect impacts of the scheme 
 
As well as the direct benefits of the grant schemes in the pilot, Defra hoped that 
they would promote greater use of protection and resilience both within the pilot 
areas and in other high-risk localities, encouraging people in these areas to take 
such measures of their own accord. To explore the significance of this 
demonstration effect, participants in the scheme were asked how the scheme 
had changed their attitudes towards flood protection. In addition, residents and 
businesses from properties in nearby at-risk areas were asked whether 
knowledge of the scheme in Appleby had changed their views and behaviours.  
 
8.1 Impact of the demonstration effect inside the pilot area 
 
A key issue in this regard is awareness of the options and confidence in their 
effectiveness. Before November 2009, the residents and business people of 
Appleby had not witnessed the performance of commercially manufactured 
protection products and so had no reason to believe in their effectiveness and 
would not have purchased them for themselves. Two things changed this 
situation: the practical demonstration of their effectiveness in November 2009 
and the expression of confidence in the measures implied by their inclusion in a 
state-sponsored scheme: 
 
Interviewer Would you have bought the gates yourself had they not been provided? 
Respondent1  Yes, definitely. Because now I know they work, then yes I mean I might 
even invest in one for the front door [...]  
Interviewer  Is it only now you‟ve seen them work? 
Respondent1  Oh yeah. 
Interviewer  Because partly what I‟m interested in is, whether people would do it 
anyway without any of this happening. 
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Respondent1  I don‟t think they would until they‟ve experienced a flood. I don‟t think 
people would think... They have to see them, they have to actually go to an 
exhibition of something where they see them in action and working and 
seeing how much water can be held back and how much water doesn‟t get 
through, to convince people to buy them really.  
 
Interviewer Would you have done it anyway, do you think?  
Respondent2 Oh probably not. I think it was because...because it [was] a government 
scheme and there was government grants there, and they recommended a 
company to start with. If you got the Yellow Pages out, starting inside to 
look at flood defences, you probably wouldn‟t have pursued it quite the 
same.   
Interviewer  How come? 
Respondent2 Well, you don‟t know what you‟re buying, do you? 
 
Interviewer  And how happy are you with what [the scheme organisers] decided you 
should have? 
Respondent3  Very, because if we‟d gone on our own to do it, we wouldn‟t have had a 
clue where to go.  
 
As illustrated in the three quotes above, people in Appleby hesitated to select 
protection products themselves because of uncertainty over what was 
appropriate to their circumstances and what would be effective. Without either 
seeing products in action or receiving expert advice such as that provided in the 
scheme, they argued that they “wouldn‟t have had a clue” what to buy.  
 
In fact, the evidence suggests that confidence in choosing measures might be a 
more important determinant of behaviour than the cost of the measures. With 
the exception of the more expensive measures such as the flood wall on The 
Sands, this indicates that people might have been willing to spend their own 
money on flood protection if they had been able to feel confident in the 
effectiveness of what they were buying.  
 
This argument does not, however, eliminate the need for the grants altogether. 
The availability of funding was probably itself one of the factors that persuaded 
people to feel confident in the measures. Furthermore, the fact that one resident 
refused to top-up the grant with his own money reveals that cost can be a 
determining factor for some residents of high-risk areas.  
 
Nonetheless, there is some indication that grant funding may not have been 
critical in all cases and that the more fundamental barrier to action might 
sometimes have been a lack of confidence about what action to take. Two 
participants in the scheme reported that they had been intent on taking action 
prior to the pilot and had only been prevented from doing so by a lack of 
confidence about which measures to purchase. Similarly, respondents from 
outside the pilot area claimed that they would be willing to pay for protection 
measures if they were sure that they would be effective and one participant in 
the scheme who did purchase his own door-board explained that he would not 
have done so without the facilitating framework provided by the scheme: 
 
Respondent  These floodgates were just so simple to use and we had thought of buying 
them before [...] [The scheme] was just an easy way of getting it because 
they ordered it all for us and we just paid the extra money. [...] Whether we 
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would have got round to it is another thing because it was that thing that it 
was easy to order. [...] I think it was the thing that somebody came to the 
door and said, “What do you want?” and you say, “Well, I‟d like this, this 
and this, and they say, “Well, your grant money stops here but you can, 
this is how much this, this and this costs and you can, if it‟s fine we‟ll just 
send you a bill.” “Okay then!” So, it was just made, I mean it sounds terrible 
doesn‟t it, but just life‟s so busy isn‟t it that you never get around to doing it, 
it‟s not that you don‟t want to do it you just... And it was just made so easy 
to just put your plans into action. Yeah. And they sorted it out with a local 
builder who took off the old sort of wooden slats where the old floodgates 
went and everything was sorted for you. They made sure that it fitted 
properly and they showed you how to fit it and it was real spoon-fed stuff 
really but it worked. Everybody took advantage of it.   
Interviewer What do you think is the key difficulty that would have stopped you? Is it 
busyness or is it...? 
Respondent It‟s getting round to it; finding the time to do it.  
 
8.2 Impact of the demonstration effect outside the pilot area 
 
As might be expected, the demonstration effect was weaker outside the pilot 
area than within it. People living outside Appleby knew that residents of the 
town had been given some kind of protection, but were often unsure of what 
had been provided, its effectiveness in the 2009 flood and, more importantly, 
the appropriateness of the particular measures to their own circumstances.  
 
Uncertainty over what had been provided was due, in part, to the low visibility of 
many of the measures in the scheme. The protection measures implemented in 
the pilot were more visually obscure than the flood defences previously 
introduced in other areas of the town (see Figure 5) and therefore less 
noticeable to passersby. One respondent from a nearby village explained that 
he had noticed the new flood wall on The Sands (Figure 11) but had not known 
about the deployable barriers, even though he was friends with someone who 
had been provided with some. This illustrates the disadvantages of protection 
measures that have no permanent, visible fixings. Although such measures are 
often favoured by homeowners because they are seen as less stigmatising, 
they are also less likely to promote a demonstration effect. 
 
Another issue affecting the power of the demonstration effect was doubt over 
the effectiveness of the scheme measures. Even scheme participants who 
experienced the 2009 flood themselves remained unconvinced of their 
effectiveness, so it is unsurprising that those outside the pilot area also 
remained uncertain. The closure of roads and bridges makes Appleby relatively 
inaccessible during flood events, so people from surrounding villages are 
unlikely witness the impact of the measures at first-hand. When Appleby 
reopened after the 2009 flood and people from outside were once more able to 
visit The Sands for their shopping and other service needs, doubts over the 
performance of the new flood protection measures were reinforced by the 
presence of sandbags, which remained visible in the town for several months 
after other protection measures had been put away. As indicated by one 
respondent, the fact that they had still needed sandbags suggested that the 
other measures had been less than fully effective by themselves. Media 
coverage might have addressed some of these doubts and uncertainties, but 
because the media tend to look for dramatic news, they emphasised the 
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damage and inconvenience that was caused by the flood and tended to give 
little emphasis to the benefits of the new flood protection measures2.  
 
  
Figure 21 Sandstone walls typical of those  
found in older buildings in and around Appleby 
 
 
 
Probably the most important constraint on the influence of the demonstration 
effect outside the pilot area was, however, doubt over the transferability of the 
measures to other circumstances. Not being intimately familiar with the 
circumstances in Appleby, people from the surrounding areas were unable to 
compare these circumstances their own. As a result, even if they had been 
convinced of the effectiveness of the measures in the pilot area, this would not 
have translated into a confidence that they could be effective in their own 
homes and businesses.  
 
One area of doubt, for example, regarded the suitability of door-barriers for 
buildings made of sandstone, whose walls might be particularly permeable to 
water (see Figure 21). Although this was a feature of buildings on The Sands as 
well as of the homes outside Appleby, it was difficult for people not from 
Appleby to know whether and how this difficulty had been overcome in the pilot. 
 
     Figure 22 Fixings for deployable barriers (left) and water-resistant render (right) 
       
 
In contrast to the distinctive blue barriers that were highly visible in media 
coverage of the floods themselves and the fittings of other flood-boards that 
                                            
2
See, for example, the piece broadcast by BBC Look North on 19 Nov 2009 -  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/local/cumbria/hi/front_page/newsid_8367000/8367951.stm 
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were noticeable at all times, measures to waterproof walls and floors are less 
noticeable and more ambiguous (see Figure 22). 
 
 
9.   Flood insurance 
 
Questions on insurance were included in this research in order to explore the 
interrelationship between property-level adaptation and the availability and cost 
of contents and buildings cover. If the implementation of resilience and 
protection measures makes it easier for businesses and householders to obtain 
insurance, or makes it more affordable, this could act as an extra incentive to 
take such measures and would also be an additional benefit of schemes of this 
nature. On the other hand, it is also possible that those with effective and 
affordable insurance against flood losses will be less inclined to take practical 
adaptation measures because they know they can rely on the cover provided by 
their insurers3. 
 
Amongst the people interviewed for this research, there was some 
inconsistency in insurance-related experiences. While some complained of high 
premiums, others said that they had been able to obtain insurance at rates 
comparable to those for properties not at risk of flooding.  
 
However, few respondents had yet informed their insurers of the measures 
introduced by the scheme. This might be because most respondents believed 
their premiums to be determined either by their postcode or according to the 
claims history of their property. As a result, there was little evidence that people 
expected insurance terms to be directly related to their efforts to reduce the risk 
exposure. Only one respondent reported that his premiums had remained lower 
because of an adaptation and this was a resilience measure implemented prior 
to the scheme. In all other cases, people either did not expect any impact on 
their insurance terms or else expected them to be indirect – i.e. as a result of 
reduced future claims.  
 
The one case where there was a direct impact was characterised by what 
seemed a particularly pragmatic and direct relationship between the insurer and 
the insured. After the 2005 event, the insurer had not only recommended and 
paid for adaptation measures to the premises of this business, but had also 
given an interim payment to replace lost stock and reduce business interruption. 
Furthermore, the owners reported that when they had objected to the insurer‟s 
view that reinstatement necessitated stripping the plaster off the walls, the 
owners‟ opinion had prevailed4. This suggests that the insurer and the business 
conducted a genuine dialogue about how to deal with the issue and that the two 
worked in partnership to reduce the impacts and potential impacts of flooding. 
 
In contrast to the one example of direct impacts on insurance terms, others 
emphasised the indirect impacts of putting flood plans in place or taking 
                                            
3
 For more on this phenomenon, known as moral hazard, see for example Baker (2002) 
4
 The respondent argued that the way in which the building had been constructed rendered this 
unnecessary.  
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protection / resilience measures. For example, several businesses felt that the 
only way to reduce insurance costs was to make fewer claims in order to 
convince the insurers that the risk really had been lowered:  
 
Respondent I‟ve already taken precautions and because we‟ve had no claims on the 
two floods since, I eventually got some recognition that I‟m not as bad a 
risk [...] and it has improved slightly.   
Interviewer Just through not claiming? Or through you saying, „look I‟ve got this and 
I‟ve got this and I‟ve got this‟?   
Respondent Effectively from not claiming when there has been a flood. So they know 
that it‟s, you know, it has to be...You know, you can tell the insurance 
company that we are now only a one-in-fifty year risk rather than a one-in-
ten, but they say well, you know, „So what? Prove it!‟ And the only way you 
can prove it is by not claiming when there‟s a flood. 
 
For some businesses, this meant refraining from making claims for smaller 
floods even if they had incurred damage. This, in turn, encouraged them to 
reduce the costs of these lesser floods by implementing protection, resilience 
and flood plans. As illustrated in the following quote, this not only reduced the 
damage and disruption caused by the smaller floods. It also meant that loss 
adjusters were more disposed to be generous when the more serious floods 
occurred, because they could see that the businesses had made every effort to 
minimise the damage and were fulfilling their part of the moral contract with the 
insurance company:  
 
Respondent That was the great thing when the insurance assessor came. He walked in 
and he obviously thought [at first], “Oh, we‟re having to pay out [lots of] 
money here.” He said, “Where are the damaged [type of stock]?” and we 
said, “What do you mean?” He said, “Obviously you‟re going to have [type 
of stock] damaged.” We said, “No, we‟ve moved them.” He said, “Right.” 
He said...next thing he looked on his list, he said, “What about the [other 
type of stock]” and we said that [the floodwater had been kept away from 
it]. It‟s all been checked and there‟s not a problem with it. So his attitude 
was then “Right, what can I help you with?” So because we‟d made an 
effort, when he realised that he‟d saved somewhere around [sum of 
money] in stock that hadn‟t been damaged, he was more than happy to... 
Interviewer He was kind of on your side with... 
Respondent Yeah, yeah.  
 
A number of the tenants in the research had no insurance at all against flood 
damage. They explained this by arguing that they did not consider the value of 
their possessions to be worth the cost of insurance; that they would be able to 
move the most precious items out of reach of flood-waters, and that they could 
easily and cheaply replace items that could not be moved, such as cookers and 
fridges. For these respondents, the key to avoiding excess flood damage was 
the timeliness of their actions to remove vulnerable goods away from 
endangered areas. In this respect, the barriers provided by the pilot scheme 
were of significant help. Even though they did not yet trust them to prevent 
water ingress, these tenants believed that they would win them more time to 
evacuate their possessions to safety. 
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10. Conclusions 
 
The experience of the Appleby pilot scheme both demonstrates the benefits of 
property-level flood protection at reducing flood damage and suggests that the 
implementation of such measures at the communal level has distinct 
advantages over their promotion to households and businesses individually. It 
also suggests that this success, and the appropriateness of such schemes to 
other areas, might depend on the coincidence of a number of different factors.  
 
10.1 Benefits of the scheme 
 
In the November 2009 flood the measures were deployed successfully, and 
were effective in reducing damage, disruption and reinstatement costs.  
 
Furthermore, as a result of the impetus given by the scheme to the setting up of 
a local flood action group, Appleby became less dependent on the support of 
external agencies during floods. This gives relief to emergency response 
resources, which can now be deployed elsewhere during widespread flooding.  
 
A further important benefit of the pilot scheme is that participants became less 
anxious about living in a flood risk area. Residents accept that a “big flood” like 
that of 2005 will still cause widespread disruption, but the presence of the 
protection afforded by the Defra scheme is allowing them to feel that they are 
resilient to the kind of flooding that occurs in Appleby almost every two years. 
 
The scheme also helped convince people of the advantages of flood protection. 
By showing that the national government was willing to pay for such measures, 
the scheme encouraged people to consider protection more seriously. This 
message was reinforced by the events of November 2009, when Appleby 
became the first of the Defra pilot areas to experience a flood and all twenty-five 
participating properties that were reached by the floodwaters were successfully 
protected. Although the flooding was only shallow and the test, therefore, a mild 
one, confidence in the measures was boosted by this experience.  
 
In spite of the fact that there was already a culture of adaptation in the town and 
the surrounding area, the hoped-for demonstration effect was only partially in 
evidence. A small number of Appleby residents were persuaded to spend their 
own money on protection measures, arguing that if the state were willing to 
invest in them, then they must be worthwhile. However, people from the 
surrounding areas were only vaguely aware of the scheme and even some pilot 
participants were not yet entirely convinced of the value of the measures that 
had been introduced and argued that it would take a more severe flood to 
convince them of their worth. 
 
The benefits of the protection measures for the insurability of local properties 
had yet to materialise. It seemed not to have occurred to residents to inform 
their insurers of their participation in the scheme and few, if any, had done so. 
Although reduced claims may in some cases lead to improved insurance terms, 
insufficient time had passed for this phenomenon to become evident.  
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10.2 Advantages of collective implementation of property-level measures 
 
Although the full benefits of the scheme had yet to be realised, it seems likely 
that a less collective approach to the problem in Appleby would have met with 
less success. Although individuals could, in theory, be allowed to select and 
finance their own property-level protection measures, few in Appleby had done 
so and those that had were unable to design packages of measures that 
provided complete protection. Furthermore, residents who did want to protect 
their homes and businesses hesitated over buying commercially available 
protection because of worries about spending large sums of money for 
uncertain benefits. The pilot scheme not only provided advice on what to buy; 
by contributing towards the costs of products it also, in effect, vouched for their 
effectiveness; and by introducing them on a large scale, it made them seem 
more normal and reduced the perceived risk involved in purchasing them.  
 
The collective nature of the scheme also had a number of other advantages. 
Effective resilience to flooding is by nature social. Floods often prompt people to 
provide each other with practical help and emotional support and they provide a 
shared experience that forms a bond between people living in the affected area. 
Concerns expressed by respondents in previous research suggest that the use 
of differing standards of protection can weaken that bond, but this research 
indicates that the introduction of protection measures across an entire locality 
can actually strengthen the cohesion between members of a community. 
Introducing protection for a whole neighbourhood helps build the relationships 
and interdependencies that are an essential part of local level resilience. This is 
especially important for areas with semi-detached homes, terraces and flats, for 
in such cases it is often impossible to achieve affective protection without 
collaboration between neighbours.  
 
Furthermore, as demonstrated in Appleby, locality-wide action can have wider 
benefits. By facilitating greater internal organisation and self-sufficiency 
amongst communities, it releases central resources for deployment elsewhere. 
Volunteer leaders of the team set up to implement the scheme in the town now 
form part of the Environment Agency‟s emergency response network. It could 
also be argued that there are wider benefits for the local community itself, for in 
Appleby the involvement of so many different sectors of the community in a 
common project added to the overall store of social capital. 
 
It was striking how central local businesses were to the management of the 
impacts of flooding in Appleby. Business-people in Appleby played a key part in 
setting up the pilot scheme and in November 2009, as in previous flood events, 
provided the means to distribute sandbags to different points in the town and 
the resources that allowed local teams to look after both victims and rescuers. 
The government grant scheme that was introduced subsequent to the pilot 
excluded businesses and focussed on providing protection for householders 
(Defra 2009). It is possible that this might compromise the relationship between 
the commercial and residential parts of a community and undermine overall 
solidarity and resilience. This issue should be considered in the evaluation of 
the scheme.  
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On the other hand, the needs of commercial enterprises are very different to 
those of most households. For some businesses on The Sands, complete 
protection was impossible or would have been very expensive. In such cases, 
although the grant made a symbolic contribution to flood risk management, the 
residual risk was high and, in some cases, business continuity remained a 
serious challenge. If businesses are to be included in protection schemes, 
consideration needs to be given to the distinctive nature of their needs. 
 
10.3 Factors determining the successful implementation of a scheme 
 
This research suggests a number of important factors that might determine the 
success of a scheme to provide flood protection to properties in a single area.  
 
The first of these is acceptance of the flood risk by the population of the area 
concerned. In Appleby, the historic frequency of the flooding made it impossible 
for local people to deny the risk. Furthermore, the distinctive self-identity of the 
town, the myth of past solidarity and resistance and the recent history of a more 
organised response to flooding all allowed the townspeople to feel some sense 
of pride in their collective resilience to the threat. Although some local people 
continued to blame the Environment Agency for not dealing with the risk at 
source (e.g. by not dredging the river), the self-presentation of local authority 
and Environment Agency staff ensured that locals were less able to shift 
responsibility onto outsiders and were able to accept that responsibility 
themselves. As a result, people in Appleby were particularly receptive to the 
notion of property-level adaptation. 
 
This was reinforced by memories of the severe flooding in 2005. Extreme 
events leave particularly vivid impressions and often, therefore, catalyse 
attempts to prevent or ameliorate any future such occurrences. The 2005 event 
was a significant catalyst for action. 
 
A further success factor that emerges from this research is the skill and 
adaptability of flood risk management agencies and their staff. The dedication 
shown by these staff was underpinned by a belief that the type of scheme being 
implemented was the best way, if not the only way, of dealing with flood risk 
management amongst many of the communities in the area.  Rather than being 
seen as a “last resort”, as it sometimes is in flood risk management, protection 
and resilience was viewed as an option that offered benefits unavailable from 
other strategies. The efforts of flood risk management professionals could not 
have been so successful without this personal commitment. It was the capacity 
of individuals and organisations to be flexible and to take risks that allowed 
them to win the trust of the local people – for example, by supporting their 
desire to set up a system for the deployment of sandbags, despite doubts over 
its practical benefits.  
 
Nor could the scheme have been so successfully implemented without strong 
inter-agency relationships and the support of senior management and council 
members of the Environment Agency and the local authority. Without the 
support and commitment of these organisations the costs and opportunity costs 
involved could not have been incurred. 
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A final reason for the successful implementation of the scheme was the 
existence of suitable social structures and leaders and the ability of influential 
townspeople to work together. Where appropriate social structures do not 
already exist, their creation can be a lengthy and time-consuming process. 
Where they do already exist, implementation timescales can be shorter, but 
only if the different elements of that structure are able to collaborate with each 
other. In Appleby, although the structure existed, the component elements were 
in a state of disharmony and it took the offer of the grant, the occurrence of the 
2005 flood and strong local leadership to bring them together. 
 
10.4 Relevance of the success factors to other areas  
 
Although it is impossible to determine from just one case-study whether the 
conditions of success identified in this study would also be pertinent outside 
Appleby, evidence from elsewhere suggests that they can probably be applied 
more widely than just this one case. 
 
The general importance of the first factor, the frequency of experience, is well 
recognised in the academic literature on flood risk and also by policymakers. 
Numerous quantitative studies have shown experience of flooding to be a 
significant predictor of protective behaviour against natural hazards such as 
flooding (e.g. Laska, 1990; Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006; Siegrist and 
Gutscher, 2008) and unpublished survey analysis by the author of this report 
further indicates that this phenomenon increases dramatically once the number 
of experiences of household flooding rises above two or three. For these 
reasons, when it issued its guidance for the rolled out flood protection grant 
scheme, Defra (2009) stipulated that grants would only be awarded in areas 
that had been flooded at least once in the previous ten years.  
 
Strong social structures, too, are recognised as being helpful for the 
establishment of community level flood adaptation. Respondents in this 
research reported that Appleby‟s sense of community stemmed from the 
presence of families that had lived there for generations. However, Coates 
(2008) found a similar sense of community in areas that lacked this 
characteristic and argues for the importance of physical locations in which 
people can meet and establish relationships – for example, shops and 
community centres. Even if there is no strong sense of pre-existing community, 
the existence of such locations allows one to develop when a flood or the offer 
of a government grant generates a common cause.   
 
Furthermore, it is important to remember that the pre-existing social structures 
and sense of identity in Appleby were both an advantage and a disadvantage 
when it came to implementing the scheme. On the one hand, they provided an 
existing resource for the delivery of the scheme. On the other hand, established 
relationships can imply old enmities and staff involved in setting up the Appleby 
pilot argued that they struggled to help the town organise its response to the 
risk partly because of such issues.  
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10.5 Risks identified by the study 
 
Neither the Appleby scheme nor any of the other pilot schemes have been in 
existence long enough for there to be any certainty regarding their longevity or 
unforeseen negative impacts. However, this research provides evidence 
regarding a number of risks, each of which is listed here before being described 
in more detail below: 
 Although there was no evidence to suggest that the scheme had 
encouraged the growth of a culture of dependency on the state, by 
displacing existing efforts at flood protection, the grant scheme might 
have reduced the longer-term adaptive self-sufficiency of local people.  
 Residents‟ need for the reassurance provided by sandbags shows that 
their confidence in the new protection measures remain tentative. This 
confidence could easily be damaged by any instance of the measures‟ 
perceived or actual failure.  
 The emphasis placed on protection might undermine efforts at increasing 
resilience – i.e. measures to limit the damage caused when water enters 
a property. 
 Residents were aware that a severe flood would overcome the pilot 
measures, so there seems little risk that such an event would lead to 
disaffection with the scheme. 
 However, the effectiveness of the protection measures provided could be 
undermined if they are not properly maintained in the future 
 And the effectiveness of the scheme overall could be threatened if key 
actors withdraw or if participants lose interest in it.  
 
Rather than stimulating an increase in the use of protection and resilience, it is 
possible that grant schemes will stifle existing community initiatives and create 
a culture of dependency. Some people in Appleby were already using home-
made protection measures before the pilot or had taken steps to increase the 
resilience of their properties. The pilot measures displaced many of the home-
made barriers and in another pilot area, Leeds, rendered superfluous a locally 
organised project that had provided standard DIY door-boards and airbrick 
covers to a number of local people. Whilst there is no doubt that the barriers 
provided by the pilot schemes are technically superior to the home-made 
equivalents, it is possible that their introduction will undermine the growth in 
self-sufficiency and responsibilisation represented by the home-made 
measures.  
 
Equally, although there was no evidence to suggest that the pilot scheme had 
made people any more dependent on government funding, neither was it clear 
whether this funding was always a necessary condition for the introduction of 
property-level protection. In some cases, financial support toward the cost of the 
measures may have been a less important determinant of behaviour than 
confidence in choosing measures.  
 
Similarly, although the motivations for implementing resilience measures5 are 
little understood, there must be a risk that the introduction of protection 
                                            
5
 I.e. measures designed to speed recover from a flood once water has achieved ingress 
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measures6 will cause resilience to be seen as unnecessary or, at best, less 
important than protection. 
 
A second risk is that confidence in the type of measures promoted by schemes 
such as the one in Appleby could be seriously damaged by any actual or 
perceived failure of these measures to protect residents from flooding. As 
demonstrated by the continued reliance on sandbags, commercially produced 
protection measures have yet to displace more traditional means in the 
confidence of the general public. Any example of failure could undermine the 
growing but delicate faith in the latter. Given the predilection of the media for 
examples of waste and error, protection measures might be reported as having 
„failed‟ even if the real issue was faulty deployment or flood-levels that 
exceeded the design specifications of a particular measure.  
 
It is possible, therefore, that attitudes towards the scheme in Appleby will 
change if there is another flood on the scale of the 2005 event. Such a flood 
would overtop the barriers supplied in the pilot, leaving residents and 
businesses with no option but to evacuate their properties. This might lead to a 
re-evaluation of the scheme, both by residents and the media, and even to the 
denigration of the very notion of property-level adaptation. On balance, 
however, this seems unlikely. Respondents in the research were aware that the 
measures would not be able to protect them from a more severe flood and did 
not give the impression that they would lose faith in the scheme or its 
organisers if this were to occur. In fact, the town had already seen the over-
topping, in 2005, of defences in the south of Appleby that were built in the 
1980s, and there was a widespread feeling that nothing could be done to 
preserve at-risk areas from a future event of the same magnitude.  
 
A more serious threat to the overall effectiveness of the scheme might be the 
danger of gradual erosion of the quality of the products and the dissipation of 
the knowledge needed for their implementation. If flood protection products are 
to maintain their effectiveness they need appropriate maintenance and storage, 
and this is likely to be more often neglected during long periods without floods 
and when homes change hands. Maintenance contracts might be one solution 
to this problem. Some manufacturers are already beginning to offer deals that 
include maintenance as well as product supply, but this was not yet the case 
when the Appleby pilot was implemented.  
This raises the issue of a further threat to the duration of the scheme benefits: 
the erosion of the organisational infrastructure set up to manage flood risk in the 
town. As indicated above, the creation and survival of the Appleby flood action 
group appeared to depend on a number of factors, including leadership, support 
from outside agencies and the enthusiasm of local people. Should any of these 
factors change (e.g. if key Environment Agency staff were to move on to new 
roles or if resourcing priorities were to change) then the survival of Appleby‟s 
flood action group might become less secure. Similarly, if there were a fall in the 
frequency of floods, the need for the group would become less immediately 
obvious and the commitment of leaders and the local population might wane. 
Some of these dangers can be anticipated, for example by holding practice 
                                            
6
 I.e. measures designed to prevent floodwater from achieving ingress into properties 
  41 
flood alarms – as is, indeed, done in Appleby – or by taking steps to formalise 
the organisational structures of flood action groups and engage in succession 
planning. Nevertheless, the longer-term survival of the Appleby scheme, and 
others like it, has yet to be tested. 
 
 
Figure 23 – flood barriers in storage 
 in the garage of an Appleby resident 
 
 
 
In the case of Appleby, the local flood risk management agencies predicted that 
to prevent a gradual decline in the effectiveness of the pilot scheme there would 
need to be continuous investment of time by the local authority and / or the 
Environment Agency. This would add to the time and effort needed for such 
initiatives. Local agencies estimate that they had already spent £70,000 
administering the scheme and establishing the necessary relationships with 
participants and local leaders. This is roughly equivalent to the amount spent on 
the initial surveys and the measures themselves and almost equals the £80,000 
awarded to them by Defra. Although the lessons learned in the pilot would 
reduce the cost of future schemes slightly, this evidence nevertheless suggests 
that the administrative and engagement costs of such initiatives are greater 
than had previously been assumed. 
 
10.6 Conclusion 
 
Although the pilot in Appleby-in-Westmorland demonstrates the challenges and 
costs of setting up schemes of this nature and the uncertainties of their long-
term future, it also shows the potential value of an effort to simultaneously 
implement property-level protection across a whole at-risk community. The pilot 
eliminated or reduced flood damage, disruption and reinstatement costs; helped 
people feel less anxious; boosted confidence in the measures, and extended 
the resources available to flood risk management agencies during a flood. 
There is little evidence of an immediate demonstration effect, but by kick-
starting the normalisation and popularisation of commercially available flood 
protection products, the pilot has made it more likely that they will be used by 
other individuals and communities in the future. 
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